









HETEROTELIC MODELS AS PERFORMATIVES:  




Performatives in the sense of speech act theory have long been held for the elementary building 
blocks of theatre and performance. This article proposes a theory of performative models as 
autonomous forms that are (1) propositional (to be worked with), (2) reified (things in their 
own right), and (3) inherently heterotelic (shifting in their purpose between models-of and 
models-for, and are always put to uses outside the epistemological system that created them). The 
article contextualises speech act theory with cultural and political events of the 1960s: the act of 
naming as an exemplary speech act is set against the disintegration of imperial powers and the 
postcolonial emancipatory initiatives striking back against the oppressive (and often 
nominalistically prescriptive) pasts. Rather than the acts of naming, the decisive factors are 
recognition (that a certain event is happening) and consensus (that the event is valid and 
constitutes a new social reality). Analysing case studies from drama and history, this article also 
,
 performances  any promises made by actors on stage cannot 
be reasonably held to account outside the stage, in real life. This profound misunderstanding on 
promises within the performed social realities of the play. The nature and validity of performatives 
made in performance is the prompt for this essay. I argue that the situation in performance is 
epistemologically not a parasitical form but rather a case of performatives more complex and 
holistic than in real life. 
 
1  In conceiving this essay I have benefitted from an illustrious company of friends and 
colleagues. I would like to thank them for their suggestions that contributed to the 
arguments and to the critical reading, as well as brought up several of the case studies. 
Among the many, I w
C. Davis, David Drozd, Campbell Edinborough, Cat Fergusson Baugh, Russell Gilbert, 
ye, Josh 
a, Adam Railton, and Freddie Rokem. 




proceeds to train it, using brutal methods that are not successful. He 
finally resorts to a new punishment: He locks the parrot in the 
henhouse with the chickens for the night. In the morning, the man goes 





Speech act theory has had it. Its heyday. As a system it was formulated in the mid-
1950s by J.L. Austin in a series of lectures. When Austin started to deliver his 
William James Lectures at Harvard University, he was elaborating on ideas that 
had occupied him since 1939; he also published on them after the war, and in the 
three years preceding his Harvard series, he delivered lectures at Oxford entitled 
. 3 It is perhaps no coincidence that his influential theory on 
 such as name a ship, declare a war, make a 
promise, and other rule-governed forms of behaviour  was first thought of in the 
year of the declaration of World War II and breaches of promise, and developed 
and delivered in immediate vicinity of McCarthyism and communist show trials. 
In that era, rule-governed declarations  words of accusation, libel, or fabricated lies 
with vested interests   
 as How to Do Things 
with Words, two years after his premature death, they entered a world that was on 
the cusp of a seismic change. Between 1955 and 1962, the critical seven years that 
included the Suez Crisis of 1956 or the 1960 Year of African Independence, the 
British Empire and the Old (rule-governed) World had almost disintegrated. 
Doing things with words depended more and more on what Austin had called the 
felicitous conditions  seemingly self-explanatory sets of circumstances that 
determined the success of speech acts (or performatives, as they are also called); 
in the new predicament the world was in, the category of felicitous conditions 
- How to 
Do Things with Words, one could argue that the entire theory is a precarious 
 
2  Viktor E. Frankl, Recollections: An Autobiography, trans. Joseph and Judith Fabry 
(Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing, 2000) 41. 
3  How to Do Things with Words: The 






concept that starts disintegrating as soon as Austin gets into discussing the 
particulars and technicalities. At that point, speech acts are far from simple affairs: 
the propositional value of the speech act statements becomes tentative, dubious, 
or even speculative  much closer in line with the Leibnizian propositionality of 
what if. 
The following two decades saw a flurry of critical activity that tried to 
the disciplines of 
linguistics (pragmatics) and the philosophy of language. The most influential 
proponent of speech act theory, John R. Searle, elaborated on this essentially 
logocentric approach to communication and social engagement and argued  
authoritatively, but rather unconvincingly  that 
 
a theory of language is part of a theory of action, simply because speaking 
is a rule-governed form of behavior. Now, being rule-governed, it has 
formal features which admit of independent study.4 
 
As long as speech act theory remains in the realm of language, its tenets and 
principles are important with their implications for a theory of action, but that 
does not automatically mean that speech act theory principles are equally valid 
and determining for action within a social reality (context, body language, speech 
 
 
it is in principle possible for every speech act one performs or could 
perform to be uniquely determined by a given sentence (or set of 
sentences), given the assumptions that the speaker is speaking literally and 
that the context is appropriate.5 
 
The possibility Searle outlines here is speculative and impracticable; his 
impossible assumption is based on an ontological fallacy of literality or objective 
6 brought 
up more questions than answers when it came to real-life application: contexts and 
conditions are always uncertain  as became ever more apparent in the years in 
which the theories were published. What the actual pragmatic remit of speech act 
 
4  John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969) 17. 
5  Searle, Speech Acts 18. 
6  Searle, Speech Acts 24-25. 




theory was beyond a narrow, analytic theory of language, became a prompt for 
increasingly technical and hair-splitting studies. Speech act theory, even in those 
early stages, had to come with numerous correctives and addenda  
seminal book Speech Acts  the 
 of misapplication and problems of reference. 
The process of disintegration continued. 
 
international des Soc
Marges de la 
philosophie, 1972) was translated by Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman a few 
years later and published in the 1977 inaugural issue of Glyph.7 
second issue of the journal and the chasm between the two schools of thought  
the Anglo-American analytic philosophy and French deconstruction theory  
opened wide, with both sides fanning the flames of their differences.8 Searle 
9 
and continuing with a rigorous repetition of the tenets of analytic, and strictly 
- gthy 
rhetoric flair of deconstruction and its 
confrontation ad personam: his title and his rhetorical device throughout the essay 
is a fictional character of Sarl ( , a limited company), 
theory when put to the test. The chasm between the two schools never closed. 
While deconstructionist theory was immensely influential, time has not been kind 
to it either: its self-contented relativism contributed significantly to the 




other related texts: Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., trans. Samuel Weber and Jeffrey 
Mehlman (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988). 
8  Glyph, 2 (1977): 198-208. 





nihilistic relativisation of historic truth  such as in the infamous affair of its 
leading proponent Paul de M
unrepentant con man  
was sh icles for a pro-Nazi Belgian 
publication, Le Soir 10 
anti-Semitic publications, his defenders  among them Derrida, himself Jewish  
used deconstructionist techniques to undermine the evidence. A potent critical 
tool, honed in 1960s France to deconstruct oppressive power structures, became a 
tool in Holocaust denying and the creeping methods of post-truth. A statement 
not made by any of the deconstructionist theorists, but by Bill Clinton during his 
Grand Jury Referral.11 Speech acts became increasingly uncertain and relative, and 
much more than the small print on the instructions leaflet of how to do things with 
words. To be sure, these are not particularly effective critical guides to analysing 
how performatives work in practice.  
This article is about performance and performative models, for which both the 
theories are necessary precursors. I do not aim to rehabilitate speech act theory or 
deconstruction; both are probably beyond redemption  perhaps apart from the 
absurdly reduced awareness that making a statement is one of the ingredients 
constituting social reality, and that any statement has elements of uncertainty and 
is incapable of controlling its meaning, respectively. The point of departure for 




promise or make a statement we had better not start our investigation with 
promises made by actors on stage in the course of a play or statements 
made in a novel by novelists about characters in the novel, because in a 
fairly obvious way such utterances are not standard cases of promises and 
statements. We do not, for example, hold the actor responsible today for 
the promise he made on stage last night in the way that we normally hold 
people responsible for their promises, and we do not demand of the author 
how he knows that his characters have such and such traits in a way that 
 
10  Michiko Kakutani, The Death of Truth (London: William Collins, 2018) 57-58. 
11  On 21 September 1998; quoted in Kakutani 68. 




we normally expect the maker of a statement to be able to justify his claims. 
Austin descri
not, for example, be promises made by actors in a play if there were not the 
possibility of promises made in real life. The existence of the pretended 
form of the speech act is logically dependent on the possibility of the 
nonpretended speech act in the same way that any pretended form of 
behavior is dependent on nonpretended forms of behavior, and in that 




any promises made by actors on stage cannot be reasonably held to account 
outside the stage, in real life. That is, of course, a profound misunderstanding on 
emit of their promises 
within the performed social realities of the play. That misunderstanding  not only 
on  is rooted in a popular, non-critical understanding 
of performance. The nature and validity of performatives made in performance is 
the prompt for this essay. I argue that the situation in performance is 
epistemologically not a parasitical form but rather a case of performatives more 
complex and holistic than in real life. 
In what follows, this article discusses several examples of performatives from 
plays and from history. Rather than narrowing down the theory of action to 
speech acts and their felicitous conditions as criteria of their validity and success 
 pursued, for instance, by Stanley Fish, who applies it, in a somewhat pedestrian 
Coriolanus13  I adopt the concept of performative models 
and social consensus. My approach is not relativist in a deconstructionist sense, 
nor absolutist in the sense of traditional speech act theory that presupposes an 
objective social reality. While certain events may have various interpretations or 
be seen even as self-contradictory in the relativist Rashomon effect, there are 
principles and even laws that govern physical as well as social reality, from 
irreversib
and legal authority, to matters of interpersonal trust and personal integrity. 
 
12  -205. 
13  Do Things with Austin and Searle: Speech Act Theory and 





In referring to models, I am elaborating on my concept of models as 
autonomous forms (material or immaterial) that are propositional (to be worked 
with) and reified (things in their own right).14 Models are inherently heterotelic, 
shifting in their purpose between models-of and models-for. A model is made for 
a purpose, as a functional, holistic proposition, and it is always put to other uses, 




O Romeo, Romeo, wherefore art thou Romeo? 
Deny thy father and refuse  
 
 




Queen Elizabeth  as uttered when smashing the 
bottle against the stem.16 
 
Instead of going with Austin and Searle into the felicitous conditions and other 
vagaries of what makes this event a legitimate and valid act of naming, I offer a 
different theoretical approach.17 Rather than seeing this as a mere act that either 
happens, or does not, let me consider it as a performative model: 
 
me this ship the Queen Elizabeth  
 
14  For a de
The Routledge Companion to Theatre and Performance Historiography, 
ed. Tracy C. Davis and Peter W. Marx (London and New York: Routledge, 2021) 400-401. 
15  William Shakespeare, The Most Excellent and Lamentable Tragedie of Romeo and Iuliet 
(London: printed by Thomas Creede for Cuthbert Burby, 1599), lines 827-38. The spelling 
has been modernised and punctuation included.  
16  Austin 5. 
17  For an alternative approac
Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic 
Perspectives, ed. Savas L. Tsohatzidis (London and New York: Routledge, 1994) 350-64. 
Holdcroft discusses the same exam
 




Witnesses of this event recognise it as the act of naming a ship  and probably 
anticipate it. The notion of recognition is crucial here: it is a model  a pattern, a 
form  that is part and parcel of the cultural knowledge we have acquired. (There 
may be cultures where it is unthinkable to give names to a ship. In such 
circumstances, no such recognition would occur.) Having recognised the model of 
naming, witnesses consider the circumstances  what Austin calls the felicitous 
conditions. In a more dynamic, real-life set-up of this scene, the success of the 
naming depends less on the abstract, analytical notion of felicitous conditions but 
on our social awareness: 
 
Even if we are out of earshot or even out of sight; 
even if we cannot understand the language of the christening; 
even if the person uttering the sentence makes a mistake; 
even if the ritual (i.e., the performative model we have recognised) is 
somehow botched and broken; 
the ship has been named Queen Elizabeth by social consensus 
because such is the social custom of the culture that frames it. 
 
This act of naming a ship also happens if this scene is part of a theatre performance 
 only with the difference that the naming is valid within that frame. The model 
itself does not change, neither its validity within the relevant frame. It is the social 
consensus that gives it its absolute validity  in real life as well as in the theatre. 
(The fictional ship in the play has been christened Queen Elizabeth as absolutely 
as -life example.) 
While it might seem that this is a speculative example and the framing by the 
social custom of the culture is a technicality, the opposite is true. If the ship had 
just been captured from the enemy, appropriated and rechristened Queen 
Elizabeth, will the enemy on recapturing it know the ship by its new name, let 
alone feel the need to rechristen it? Let us consider a historic act of naming, rather 
than the fictional example that Austin gives. In his account 
es to Walter Raleigh of an event 











act of naming Virginia, and the English social consensus retained the name and 
sealed it by its colonisation. While Austin, conceiving his speech act theory at the 
height of the British Empire, and Searle writing in the city of Boston, would well 
have taken this act of naming as complete, the social consensus framed by the 
political system and the culture is defining and absolute. It may well be that the 
State of Virginia soon 
names too, and Virginia is, once again, not only named Wingandacoa but also 
consensually known as such. In 1964, two years after the publication of How to Do 
Things with Words, an interesting act of naming occurred. The boxing champion 
legally,19 he insisted on being called his new adopted name for the rest of his life. 
The model of naming is the same, but the social consensus was gradual and even 
painful and physically performative  as in his 1967 bout with Ernie Terrell, in 
which Ali batters Terrell insisting: 20  
The postcolonial act of renaming was an important cultural moment since the 
Speech Acts, the Martiniquan 
, a postcolonial 
riposte to Shakes
between Caliban and Prospero: 
 
 
PROSPERO: Important? Well, out with it. 




to the name Caliban. 
PROSPERO: Where did you get that idea? 
CALIBAN: Well, because Caliban  my name  
 
 
19  Never Legally Changed N
USA Today Sports, 11 July 2016, https://eu.usatoday.com/story/sports/boxing/2016/07/ 
11/muhammad-ali-name-change-cassius-clay/86956544/ (accessed 10 November 2020). 
20  Russell es highly relevant case studies of adopted 
names and masks that traverse between the arenas of professional wrestling and politics. 





mething. What will it be? Cannibal would 
historical names. 
CALIBAN: Call me X. That would be best. Like a man without a name. Or, 
to be more precise, a man whose name has been stolen. You talk about 
everything from me, even my identity! Uhuru! (He exits.)21 
 
-enacts the (by now) recognisable model of postcolonial 
renaming: cultural phenomenon modelled by way of tribute on the postcolonial 
and religious defiance of Muhammad Ali and his mentor Malcolm X, assassinated 
in 1965. Approaching these performatives as models rather than as declarative 
speech acts allows a more precise acknowledgement of the social consensus at 
play and the cultural and socio-political frame at play: these performatives are not 
only about names; these models are repurposed to reflect what is unique about 
performance  the shared sense of social reality: the here-and-now. The cultural 
s the performative 
nd brings the fictional incident to (real) life. 
Approaching critically the moment as a performative model rather than a 
performative sentence or speech act enables the uncoupling of the utterance from 
its pragmatics: the crucial critical lapse of traditional speech act theory. Having 
recognised the action as a particular model  an act of naming, or even more 
specifically an act of renaming oneself  the act allows the activation of cultural 
mative acts of 
naming in their own right but also acts declaring allegiance to a political 
movement; they also acquire some of their power from the cultural momentum 
they invoke by this allegiance. The cultural implications and momentum of that 
particular performative model (whether of Cassius Clay/Muhammad Ali or of 
Caliban/X) are a social process that is commensurate, if not identical, with the social 
, irrespective of whether it is a 
 
21  A Tempest (1.2.218-43), trans. Richard Miller; The Harcourt Brace Anthology 






real-life act (Cassius Clay/Muhammad Ali), or a fictional one (Caliban/X). Using 
one or the other name to refer to them becomes then a social act of allegiance, 
solidarity or opposition: as we know well not only from the altercation between 
Ali and Terrell, but also from the many instances of people referring to places by 
their old names after their politically motivated renamings  as, for instance, in the 
case of the city of Gottwaldov in communist Czechoslovakia (renamed after the 
first communist president of the country), which was called by its original name, 
-WWI period, when the Slovak capital of Bratislava was still 
referred to by its earlier German or Hungarian names (Pressburg and Pozsony, 
respectively). Using a particular name was a declaration of allegiance by invoking 
a particular social consensus and its socio-political framework. 
Let us consider a more historic and complex instance of personal renaming, 
discussed by Kwame Anthony Appiah.22 In 1707, a young boy was taken from 
s 
Anton Wilhelm Rudolph Mohre, a servant of Duke Anton Ulrich von 
Braunschweig-
erudition, a knowledge of half a dozen modern and classical languages, a 
doctorate in philosophy at Wittenberg, and renown as an authority in philosophy. 
At some point in his career, he adopted the name Anton Wilhelm Amo Afer, 
adding to his Christian also his original Nzema name of Amo and the Latin 
attribute Afer to signal his African origin. After a career in Germany, Amo 
23 Apart from the baptismal record, the naming 
and renaming acts are irretrievable. However, the performative models can be 
safely assumed: 
 
 the Nzema boy, whose original name is unknown, was baptised Anton 
Wilhelm Rudolph Mohre (Mohr being the German word for moor); 
 Anton Wilhelm starts using the name Anton Wilhelm Amo Afer, declaring 
his origin (afer) and probably reasserting his birthname (Amo), although it 
involved; 
 Anton Wilhelm Amo Afer drops his given Christian names on returning to 
the African Gold Coast, assuming (or reverting?) to his Nzema name of 
 
22  Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Lies that Bind: Rethinking Identity. Creed, Country, Colour, 
Class, Culture (London: Profile Books, 2018) 108-18. 
23  Appiah 134. 




Amo; again, it is unknown and irrelevant if there was a speech act 
involved, but the model of renaming clearly took place. 
 
What is lost alongside the historical circumstances and concrete events is also the 
social momentum and consensus of the naming acts. The names attached to the 
real-life person of Amo may be many, and while this fluidity and its doubtful 
speech acts may be frustrating to the nominalist, the reality of the historic persona 
remains unchanged and undoubtable. 
 
Immaterial Models and Propositionality 
 
Jak se to neb ono vskutku stalo 
ybylem.24 
 
[How did this or that really happen is a question that cannot be fully 
answered even by a direct participant; they would need to be 
omniscient and omnipresent.] 
 
There are a great variety of performative acts and many of them are done with 
words but, more often than not, they are not as strictly delimited and clear-cut as 
speech act theory would wish. The last example of Anton Wilhelm Amo Afer 
testifies to the fuzzy nature of even such simple performative acts as naming. 
Other performatives  among many others, such acts as admissions and 
declarations of unpleasant truths, threats, accusations, apologies, or the loss of 
political power  are much less apparent, and it is the effort of recognising the 
model at play that assumes great importance. 
Cl  what the 
 is less of a speech act on the ontological state of the 
verb to be but rather a covert and indirect admission of an unpleasant truth. The 
admission is far from transparent here, and even less legally so, although the 
performative model, hidden behind the evasive and relativising answer, is 
obvious. The irony of this model is not dissimilar from the parrot joke that I used 
as superscript for this essay: how the model is used often radically differs from its 
intended purpose. The same model is at play in another admission  from Rolf 
 
24  Otakar Zich, Estetika dramati  (Aesthetics of Dramatic 






The Representative (Der Stellvertreter), published 
Eichmann in Jerusalem), which caused a great uproar 
by laying open the Vatican 25 In the following 




do you declare yourself against your race  
and for Adolf Hitler who wishes to free  
the world of that race? 
MANUFACTURER: My behaviour during this war  
is proof enough of that. 
SALZER: Behaviour from which one earns  
as much as you do from this war  
is no proof of any kind. Stop quibbling:  
do you approve of the extermination of the Jews?  
Yes or no? 
 
SALZER: Yes or no, man? Stop wasting my time. 
MANUFACTURER: Yes. 
SALZER: That sounded a bit thin.26 
 
While the admission is resisted as much as can be, there is no doubt that it is made: 
the model is clearly identifiable, although the SS officer Salzer finds the speech act 
-
admitting to the truth is fuzzy, lacking in gestural clarity, but the social consensus 
on the part of the audience as well as the fictional personas of the play is obvious. 
Given that this model is part of a theatre play, written by Hochhuth to 
communicate more than an admission of a fictional persona, it works (like 
 renaming) on other levels too: models resonate both within and without 
the theatre frame  not only within the fictional frame of the play but also, 
figuratively, in reference to the real world. A model, by my definition heterotelic, 
is put to various uses; here, the performative model communicates not only the 
complicity of converted Jews with the Nazi anti-Semitic machinery, but also the 
cul-de-sac dilemmas and systemic blackmail orchestrated by the regime.  
 
25  Rolf Hochhuth, The Representative (Der Stellvertreter. Ein christliches Trauerspiel), trans. 
Robert David MacDonald (London: Methuen, 1963). 
26  Hochhuth 159. 




It also resonates on a metaphorical level: activating personal and cultural 
histories by virtue of its proposition. That heterotelic dimension of performative 
models plays a significant role in the theatre, prompting complex hermeneutic 
l and intellectual 
connections. That is what is referred to as the Hecuba question, derived from 
 
 
trous that this Player here, 
But in a Fiction, in a dream of Passion, 
Could force his soul so to his whole conceit, 
 
 
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting 
With Forms to his Conceit? And all for nothing! 
For Hecuba? 
 to him, or he to Hecuba, 
That he should weep for her?27 
 
Philosopher Ted Cohen has dedicated an insightful essay to this moment in 
Hamlet, to reflect on the metaphorical power of theatre  and, by extension, fiction 
 to activate emotions and memories, personal and public  or, as he calls it, to 
cultivate intimacy.28 Theatre metaphors  i.e., performative models  do more than 
o
The momentum theatre metaphors solicit in the spectators creates a community of 
shared knowledge: we all respond to Hecuba in one way or another  visualising 
her suffering, empathising with and pitying her fate, projecting our experiences 
onto that mental image. At the same time, we are aware that other spectators are 
being moved too  and although everyone in a different, individual way, the 
community of shared knowledge (what Victor Turner refers to as communitas) 
embodies a social consensus.  
The performative model  the fictional Hecuba (the metaphor in its fuzzy, 
indeterminate, and even aporetic abstraction)  is what enables the activation of 
this shared, social consensus, while retaining individual variation and uniqueness. 
 
27  William Shakespeare, The Tragedie of Hamlet, Prince of Denmarke, in Mr. William 
Shakespeare's Comedies, Histories, & Tragedies (London: Edward Blount and Isaac Jaggard, 
1623), lines 1591-99. The spelling and punctuation have been modernised. 
28  Thinking of Others: On the Talent for Metaphor 





This hermeneutic potential is the inherent quality of the performative model, as 
well as of its subspecies, the stage metaphor.29 Everyone has probably been 
involved, at some point in their lives, in a heated debate over the meaning of a 
performative model experienced in the theatre  whether it was over an evocative 
piece of stage decoration or another aspect of scenography, over the interpretation 
of a cryptic line or a gesture, or an idiosyncratic behavioural pattern in portraying 
a character (was the actor imitating someone or not?). It is in the interpretive 
openness that the per e full. 
Some performative models are intentionally fuzzy, emphasising their 
propositional value  as in the following real-life experience of around 2000, 
recorded by journalist Jon Ronson, of his engagement with the London-based 
extremist Omar Bakri, who 
30 -proclamations were clearly calculated and 
opportunistic: 
 
I telephoned Omar on the evening of his arrest [in mid-  
 he police say they may deport me. 
Why are people linking me with Bin Laden? I do not know the man. I have 
 
  
Britain for  
 




What is remarkable in this incident is the attempt at disavowing a proposition as 
a mere proposition. In other words, the model of self-proclamation is now to be 
reinterpreted differently, and the social consensus is to be reverted; the model is 
to be used to different ends. 
 
29  For a recent study on the stage metaphor informed b
M Otello
Theatre Production (Brno 1967) in the Context of Otello Staging T Theatralia, 
19.2 (October 2016): 29-58. 
30  Jon Ronson, Them: Adventures with Extremists (London: Picador, 2001) xv. 
31  Ronson xvi. 




 this time the propositional 
performative model being one of threat: 
 
  
 joking! I say that to my children! If you 
 
  







Bakri is deploying the performative model of threat and frames it, duplicitously, 
in two ways at the same time: as a genuine threat and as an innocent, avuncular 
joke. There is little doubt what the model at play is; it is its propositionality and the 
social consensus that are fluid. 
There are also examples of performative models of resolution that are obvious 
in both its determination and its proposition, but not in the social consensus. Let 
us leave aside the notorious dramatic example from Samuel Beckett s Waiting for 
Godot of Vladimir and Estragon resolving to go without ever moving. An 
jewel-encrusted clothing in response to the popularity of pearls from the 
Caribbean: 
 
But it was too late: pearls had already crossed the threshold from the global 
exotic to the domestic familiar. Trying to legislate against them was like 
trying to make breathing illegal. Within ten years, the King was obliged to 
exempt pearls from his general ban.33 
 
The model of a public ban is more than obvious and legally binding  a perfect 
Austin-Searlian speech act  but the proposition of the law was ignored and the 
lacking social consensus rendered it void. 
 
32  Ronson 284. 
33  Than All His Tribes: The Excessively Mutable World of a 





Let me conclude with another complex real-life example of a performative 
model: the loss of political power, or the fall of a political regime. This case study 
is remarkable for its indubitable outcome (success), even to the point of being cited 
as a prime example of the fall of a political regime in real time. And yet, while the 
model is apparent, its identification  that is, the moment of recognition needed 
for the necessary social consensus  is a result of a complex web of cultural 
knowledge. 
Historian Yuval Noah Harari retells the situation: 
 
On 
Romania, organised a mass demonstration of support in the centre of 
of his trademark dreary 
speeches. For eight minutes he praised the glories of Romanian socialism, 
looking very pleased with himself as the crowd clapped mechanically. And 
want to thank the initiators and organisers of this great 
event in Bucharest, considering it as a  
open wide, and he freezes in disbelief. He never finished the sentence. You 
can see [on the surviving footage] in that split second how an entire world 
-mi- -ra! 
Ti-mi- - 34 
 
but rather as an 
articulation of the indubitable consensus that what occurred at that moment, in 
power  or, if you wish, the model of fall of regime. While the outcome was 
absolute and beyond any doubt, and while that breaking point is also obvious, the 
identification of the model  the recognition that the regime has collapsed  is clear 
only in hindsight. While potentially (propositionally) possible at that point, the 
model attained its immaterial form only later, as a result of substantial socio-
political activity and in gradual steps. 
 
34  Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (London: Vintage, 2015) 155-57. 
For a critical history of the fall of communism in Romania, see, among others, Dennis 
Deletant, Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989 
(London: Hurst and Company, 1995) 359ff. 




Looking at the surviving video footage of the fated mass demonstration in 
momentary loss of bodily tonus, of his vocal security and gestural confidence is 
clearly visible; this ostensive performative behaviour happens, but it is a minor 
lapse, not in itself a fall of regime. The eventual outcome is far from obvious from 
this moment: the social and political consensus was only just gathering 
momentum  and clearly this mid-sentence lapse was not the first or the ultimate 
sign of loss. In other words, the central performative model at play  the one for 
which that moment is known, recorded in history, and even cited as a crying 
example (as in Harari)  was not an identifiable performative act at that point. It 
was merely a propositional model, framed in its momentum by many intervening 
circumstances  from the fall of several other regimes in Central and Eastern 
(invoked by the chanting masses in Bucharest), to the disintegrated Securitate no 
longer capable of enacting its political power (which was also, in turn, caused by 
the loss of the social consensus in its validity). There would be other moments that 
iterated that momentary mid-
bit by bit the momentum leading to the undoubted general consensus. Some of 
the iterations of that model preceded the fated moment on 21 December 1989, such 
as the sending of armed forces to sup
signs of disintegration of the communist camp, while some of them followed it: 
attempts a moment later at reasserting his authority (which 
mass demonstration), to the 
repressions in the upcoming hours and days. 
 
-post repurposing of a 
performative model. From a historical and political point of view, there is no 
doubt that this was the tipping point, but that tipping point was not in the model 
itself but rather in the social consensus that has reached a critical mass. That new 
awareness repurposed the performative model and framed it as the moment when 
the regime collapsed. It had not been intended as such; it had been unforeseen and 
unexpected; it was rather innocuous and seemingly inconsequential  and yet. 
What is crucial is the shared, public recognition of what that minute model 
eventually meant: the fall of communism in Romania.  
Performative models as heterotelic entities have the potency to convey 
numerous purposes  thanks to their figurative (metaphoric, symbolic, ironic) 
qualities. How they are deployed, what uses they are put to, and what 
interpretations they solicit in its participants depends on the cultural frames, the 
interests they vest  and social momentum they garner. 
